O n Sunday, June 27, 1993, a bomb exploded in the garden of a hotel in Antalya, a popular tourist destination along Turkey's Mediterranean coast.
1 That same night, not far from the first hotel, a second bomb went off in front of the Sheraton hotel and a third in a shopping area nearby. These attacks marked the beginning of a string of bombings of public places in major cities across Turkey. The leader of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), a rebel group fighting to gain autonomy for Turkey's Kurdish minority, announced that he had ordered the bombings, with the aim of coercing the Turkish government into negotiating.
2 Several years earlier, in El Salvador, commanders of the Frente Farabundo Mart ı para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN) had offered a similar explanation for their attacks on civilian infrastructure targets such as electric lines and power stations, saying that their intention was to force government concessions. While both groups sought to pressure the government by imposing costs on the civilian population and the country's economy, they did so in different ways, with the PKK attacking populated civilian targets and the FMLN bombing less populated targets. This article addresses two questions arising from these examples. First, why do some rebel groups engaged in civil war use terrorist tactics, attacking civilian targets in an effort to coerce their government opponent, while other groups choose other tactics? Second, among groups that use terrorism, what can explain differences in the types of targets groups attack?
Scholars of civilian targeting have looked at variation in the use of violence against civilians across interstate wars (Downes 2006 (Downes , 2008 Valentino, Huth, and Croco 2006) and across civil wars (Eck and Hultman 2007; Hultman 2012; Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay 2004) ; but these studies group together all forms of violence against civilians, relying on counts of the number of civilians killed to identify cases of civilian targeting. Yet, during war civilians are killed in multiple ways, and some violence against civilians, such as the FMLN's infrastructure attacks, inflicts suffering without killing large numbers of people. Disaggregating civilian targeting and analyzing forms of violence against civilians permits closer examination of the causes of violence, as different forms of violence are associated with different strategic objectives. In targeting civilians, rebel groups may seek to change the behavior of civilians themselves, using violence to deter civilians from aiding the opponent (Kalyvas 2006) . Rebel groups may also use violence to alter the behavior of a third party: the government. By attacking the wider civilian population, as the PKK did in bombing hotels and shopping areas, a rebel group can increase the costs of the conflict in the hope that the government will make concessions rather than endure continuing losses. While others have examined violence aimed at inducing civilian cooperation during civil war (e.g., Kalyvas 2006) , less research has been done on violence aimed at coercing the opponent. This article looks at variation in this particular form of violence against civilians: violence aimed at coercing the opponent.
The use of violence against civilian targets as a means of coercing the opponent would qualify as terrorism according to many definitions of the term. Many definitions emphasize that terrorism aims to convey a message to an audience other than those targeted with violence (Weinberg, Pedahzur, and Hirsch-Hoefler 2004) . In Hoffman's words, ''terrorism is specifically designed to have far-reaching psychological effects beyond the immediate victim(s) or object of the terrorist attack. It is meant to instill fear within, and thereby intimidate, a wider 'target audience' . . . '' (2006, 40-41) . While some definitions of terrorism include violence against government and military personnel not actively engaged in military operations, I restrict my definition to violence against civilian targets. For the purposes of this article, therefore, terrorism in the context of civil war is the deliberate use of violence against civilians by a nonstate actor with the aim of achieving a political objective through the intimidation or coercion of the government.
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Most cross-national analyses of terrorism focus on transnational groups, such as al-Qaeda, rather than domestic groups, such as the PKK. The few existing cross-national studies of domestic terrorism look at variation across countries in the number of total terrorist incidents, including incidents occurring in the context of civil war and incidents occurring outside of civil war (Enders, Sandler, and Gaibulloev 2011; Piazza 2011). 4 While these studies can provide insight into the types of countries that are more or less prone to terrorist attacks, they cannot answer questions about why some groups choose terrorist tactics, while other similarly situated groups adopt different tactics. As Ashworth et al. point out in their critique of Pape's research on suicide terrorism, ''identifying the correlates of terror requires data on groups that use terrorism and groups with similar grievances that do not '' (2008, 272) . Looking at the behavior of rebel groups in civil war provides a means of answering such questions; rebel groups face similar strategic circumstances, in that they are engaged in violent struggles against their own governments, and yet rebel groups vary in the tactics they use.
5 What can explain why some rebel groups use terrorism, while other rebel groups do not?
Much of the research on wartime civilian targeting as well as on transnational terrorism has focused on how the military context shapes belligerent decisions, arguing that belligerents attack civilians as a means of compensating for military weakness (Crenshaw 1981; Hultman 2007; Pape 2003 Pape , 2005 or coping with rising conflict costs (Downes 2006 (Downes , 2008 . Other studies of transnational terrorism suggest that violence against civilians is most common when multiple groups are competing for popular support; in such cases, groups attack civilians as a means of outbidding rival groups (Bloom 2005; Chenoweth 2010; Kydd and Walter 2006) . This existing research provides some insights useful in understanding rebelgroup use of terrorism in the context of civil war; rebel groups do, in fact, weigh the benefits of engaging in violent attacks on civilians. Missing from these analyses, however, is a discussion of two components central to rebel-group strategic calculations. First, in weighing the benefits of violence, rebel groups consider their government opponent-in particular, whether the government will respond to violence by making concessions. In democratic systems, political institutions create incentives for the government to be responsive to public demands; rebel groups, therefore, perceive democracies as sensitive to civilian losses. Thus, the more democratic the government, the more likely it is that the rebel group will use terrorism. Second, rebel groups consider not only the benefits of violence, but also its costs. Rebel groups whose political objectives demand that they appeal to a broad civilian constituency may not be willing to risk suffering public backlash in response to violence; these rebel groups are likely to use forms of terrorism that impose costs without inflicting high civilian casualties, while rebel groups with narrower bases of civilian support have greater flexibility to attack high-casualty targets.
Scholars have debated extensively the relationship between government regime type and terrorism, 3 Apart from its focus on civil war, this definition is similar to definitions in other studies of terrorism (Chenoweth 2010; Enders, Sandler, and Gaibulloev 2011; Piazza 2011). 4 For a study of domestic-based terrorism occurring outside of civil war, see Sambanis (2008) .
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The incidence of terrorism and civil war overlap significantly (Findley and Young 2012) .
with some arguing that democratic governments are more prone to terrorism (Chenoweth 2010; Weinberg 1994, 2001; Li 2005; Li and Schaub 2004; Pape 2003 Pape , 2005 Schmid 1992; Weinberg and Eubank 1998) and others questioning this link between democracy and terrorism (Eyerman 1998; Kurrild-Klitgaard, Justesen, and Klemmensen 2006; Piazza 2008a Piazza , 2008b Sambanis 2008; Sandler 1995; Wade and Reiter 2007) . But like other research on the causes of terrorism, these studies have focused on transnational terrorism rather than domestic terrorism. Scholars have yet to examine the relationship between government regime type and terrorism occurring in the context of civil war. 6 The findings in this article indicate that rebel groups are more likely to use terrorism against democratic opponents, but the form that terrorism takes depends on whether the rebel group needs to maintain a broad base of civilian support.
I begin by discussing in greater detail the hypotheses on government regime type, rebel-group political objectives, and terrorism. I then introduce an original data set on rebel-group use of terrorism in all civil wars from 1989 to 2010. The last section discusses two illustrative cases: the PKK's separatist insurgency in Turkey and the FMLN's revolutionary insurgency in El Salvador.
Strategies of Terrorism in Civil War
While we tend to think of wars as ending in a victory for one side or the other, in fact, since the end of the Cold War, outright military victories in civil war have been rare (DeRouen and Sobek 2004) . With the majority of civil wars ending through negotiated settlements, rebel groups often aim to elicit the greatest political concessions possible from their government opponents. Attacks on government military forces are perhaps the most obvious way in which rebel groups seek to coerce governments. Many rebel groups, however, are significantly weaker than their government opponents, making it difficult to impose high enough costs through attacks on military targets alone to force government concessions. Rebel groups thus often combine attacks on military targets with other means of increasing the conflict's costs. Some rebel groups seek to leverage the support of international actors, imposing international costs on the government, such as economic sanctions. Other rebel groups attack civilian targets; by inflicting civilian casualties, disrupting civilian life, and weakening the economy, rebel groups seek to increase the civilian costs of the conflict.
The use of violence against civilians as a means to coerce the government-what I refer to as terrorism-is not the only form of violence against civilians that rebel groups may use. What differentiates terrorism from other forms of violence against civilians is the target audience for violence: the group whose behavior a rebel group aims to change through the use of violence. Much rebel-group violence against civilians aims to change the behavior of civilians themselves. Violence may serve as a means of deterring civilians from supporting the opponent; by controlling civilians, rebel groups can extend their control over territory (Kalyvas 2006) . In some conflicts, rebel groups aim to rid a territory of its civilian population entirely, using violence against civilians as a means of inducing others to flee or, in more extreme cases, as a means of eliminating the civilian population (Downes 2008; Valentino 2004) . These forms of violence against civilians-violence aimed at controlling or cleansing the civilian population-have received significant attention in the literature on civil war. In this article, I focus on violence with a different target audience-violence intended to alter the behavior of a third-party actor: the government. By attacking the government's civilian constituents, a rebel group can ratchet up the costs of the conflict, in the hopes that the government will make concessions rather than endure the continuing loss of civilian lives (Hultman 2007 (Hultman , 2012 .
In deciding whether to use terrorism, rebel groups behave strategically.
7 First, rebel groups consider the potential benefits of using terrorist violence, which depend on the extent to which the government is likely to be sensitive to civilian losses. The greater a government's sensitivity to losses among its constituents, the more likely it is that the government will respond to violence by making concessions, thus making terrorism more appealing. Although the government and the rebel group are the primary actors in a civil war, they also compete for support from domestic and international constituencies. Thus, second, rebel groups assess the costs of terrorist violence-namely, whether it is possible to use violence without losing support from key constituencies. If both sides are competing for support from the same domestic constituents, then it may be difficult for the rebel group to 6 On democracy and civilian targeting more generally, see Eck and Hultman (2007) and Hultman (2012) . attack civilians without alienating potential supporters. Rebel groups that seek the support of international actors may worry that attacks on civilians will bring international condemnation. Finally, rebel groups weigh these costs and benefits against the available alternatives to terrorism.
Scholars of international relations have long argued that democratic governments are more sensitive than autocratic governments to the costs of war. Democratic peace arguments claim that because the domestic public must bear the costs of war and because democratic political institutions allow public influence over decision making, democratic leaders have incentives to respect the preferences of their citizens and to avoid entering into costly wars (Doyle 1986; Oneal and Russett 2001; Russett 1994) . Institutional constraints also influence how democratic governments fight wars, with scholars observing that democratic governments have difficulty tolerating long and costly wars; fight only those wars they are likely to win; and adopt policies to minimize the costs of war (Bueno de Mesquita et al.1999; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2004; Reiter and Stam 2002; Valentino, Huth, and Croco 2010) . In addition, democratic ideals emphasizing respect for individual rights may encourage democratic governments to value the lives of their citizens more highly, making democratic governments more sensitive to military and civilian casualties (Valentino, Huth, and Croco 2010) .
Extending these arguments to the civil war setting, I argue that rebel groups consider the regime type of their government opponent when deciding which form of violence will best aid them in achieving their political objectives. Because political institutions and norms in democratic countries create incentives for leaders to be responsive to the domestic public, rebel groups perceive democratic governments as vulnerable to domestic public pressure.
8 Rebel groups facing democratic governments seek to exploit this vulnerability in their opponents by using violence deliberately in an attempt to manipulate public opinion (Merom 2003) . Generating enough public pressure to force government concessions is not an easy task; but the broader institutional setting within democratic countries-in particular, the tendency for democratic countries to protect the freedom of the press-makes it easier for rebel groups to capture public attention (Li 2005) .
Rebel groups are likely to perceive autocratic governments as less susceptible to domestic public pressure. While autocratic leaders do have political constituencies whose support they must maintain to remain in power (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2004; Weeks 2008) , in comparison to democracies, autocratic governments are less vulnerable to the demands of the domestic public.
9 Autocratic states tend to place restrictions on individual freedoms and the media, meaning that public criticism of the government is difficult. Even when criticism is possible in autocratic states, in the absence of an institutionalized political mechanism, such as elections, through which the government could be removed from power, the government has little need to respond to public criticism.
10 Efforts to use terrorism as a means of mobilizing public pressure on the government to make concessions are unlikely to be effective against an autocratic opponent.
Some might challenge the argument that the public in a democracy is likely to respond to terrorism by pressuring the government to make concessions, claiming that the public is just as likely to respond by rallying in support of the government. Yet, studies of the rally 'round the flag effect show that although an initial surge in support for the government may follow dramatic wartime events, this rally effect declines as the costs of a conflict mount (Gartner and Segura 1998; Mueller 1973) . Negative information-for example, about casualties incurred during a terrorist attack-can be difficult for a democratic government to counteract, increasing the likelihood of opposition to government policies (Merom 2003) . As studies of terrorism in Israel have found, although public support for candidates advocating hard-line policies may increase in the short term, terrorist violence may encourage support for more moderate, conciliatory policies over the long term (e.g., Berrebi and Klor 2008) . Rebel groups are aware of the risk of backlash, but choose terrorism both because their time horizons are long-they are willing to wait for public pressure on the government to build over time-and because other available alternatives for coercing the government are limited.
Terrorism is not the only strategy available to rebel groups seeking to generate costs on the government beyond those associated with attacks on military targets. Another way in which rebel groups can impose costs on the government is by appealing to international actors for support. Foreign governments or international organizations may pressure the government to make concessions, threatening diplomatic, economic, or military sanctions for continued intransigence. Not all rebel groups, however, are well positioned to make international appeals. As international norms favoring democratic forms of government have grown stronger, the legitimacy of a government has increasingly become associated with the degree to which institutions allow for broad participation in the political system. Rebel groups facing democratic opponents thus are likely to have difficulty proving the validity of their grievances. The more democratic the government opponent, therefore, the more likely it is that the rebel group will use terrorism, for two reasons: first, rebel groups perceive democratic governments as more sensitive to domestic public pressure and, therefore, more likely to make concessions in response to rising civilian costs; and second, rebel groups facing democratic governments are likely to have difficulty winning support from international actors, limiting their other available options for generating pressure on the government.
Although all rebel groups have incentives to use terrorism when fighting against a democratic government, the form that terrorism takes will vary depending on how the rebel group weighs the domestic costs of violence. Some rebel groups have exclusionary political objectives, seeking to achieve gains for a particular religious or ethnic group, to the exclusion of other groups; these groups tend to have narrow constituencies. Other rebel groups have more inclusive political objectives and, thus, seek wider bases of civilian support. Rebel groups that need to maintain a broad base of support cannot afford to use violence in ways that might lead to popular backlash.
11 These rebel groups are likely to use terrorist violence selectively, seeking to generate pressure on the government by imposing high civilian costs, but not necessarily high civilian casualties-for example, by attacking infrastructure targets-in the hopes that avoiding casualties will minimize backlash. Rebel groups whose political objectives seek to exclude significant groups from participation in politics, in contrast, have narrower bases of civilian support; these rebel groups have greater flexibility in their ability to use violence and are more likely to attack high-casualty targets.
Two hypotheses follow from these theoretical arguments:
H1: The more democratic the government, the more likely it is that the rebel group will engage in terrorism.
H2: Rebel groups with inclusive political objectives should be less likely than rebel groups with exclusionary political objectives to adopt high-casualty strategies of terrorism.
Methodology
To test these hypotheses, I created an original data set on rebel-group use of terrorism in all civil wars from 1989 to 2010. The cases are drawn from the UCDP/ PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, which defines internal armed conflict as ''a contested incompatibility that concerns government or territory or both where the use of armed force between two parties results in at least 25 battle-related deaths'' and ''occurs between the government of a state and internal opposition groups'' (Gleditsch et al. 2002, 618-19) . Following standard definitions of civil war, I focus on conflicts with at least 1,000 battle-related deaths (Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Fearon and Laitin 2003) .
I limit my universe of cases to post-Cold War civil wars-civil wars that began or were ongoing after 1989. Multiple, detailed sources of information are available for post-Cold War conflicts, reducing the likelihood of biased coding. Theoretically, it makes sense to focus on this time period, as the strategic context confronting rebel groups changed dramatically at the end of the Cold War when groups could no longer rely on ideology to attract superpower backing. The list of cases-96 civil wars in total-is available in the online appendix.
Measuring the Independent Variables. To measure Government Level of Democracy, I use the country's polity score from the Polity IV Project, in the year the conflict began; scores range from 210 (most autocratic) to 110 (most democratic) (Marshall and Jaggers 2009). 12 Of the 96 governments in the data set, 19 are democratic (scores greater than or equal to 16). 13 The majority of conflicts, 80.2%, took place in states with nondemocratic regimes, split fairly evenly 11 Zahar (2001) makes a related argument about how a group's political objectives influence its treatment of civilians. Asal and Rethemeyer (2008) argue that domestic and transnational terrorist groups whose ideologies identify a distinct out-group (e.g., ethnonationalist groups) are more likely to kill civilians than groups whose ideologies do not identify a distinct out-group (e.g., leftist groups).
between autocratic regimes (scores less than or equal to 26) and anocratic regimes (scores from 25 to 15). To identify rebel groups that seek a broad base of civilian support, I look at whether rebel-group political objectives are inclusive. The distinction between revolutionary and separatist groups provides a starting point. 14 Separatist groups, which seek autonomy for a particular region, tend to have exclusionary objectives, fighting on behalf of a particular ethnic or religious group; while revolutionary groups, which seek power in the central government, often require broad civilian constituencies to threaten government control over national institutions. Still, some revolutionary groups, such as religious extremist groups, do have exclusionary objectives. Inclusive Rebel Group is a dichotomous variable; revolutionary insurgencies with nonreligious political objectives are coded as inclusive, while separatist insurgencies and revolutionary insurgencies with religious objectives are coded as exclusionary. Slightly more than half of rebel groups (58.3%) are exclusionary.
To assess the claim that weaker rebel groups are more likely to use terrorism, I include Relative Strength, a ratio of average annual government troop strength to average annual rebel-group troop strength, based on data from The Military Balance and the SIPRI Yearbooks; this variable is logged. To capture conflict costs, Conflict Intensity measures average annual battlerelated deaths, logged.
15 Because outbidding arguments predict that terrorism is more likely in conflicts involving multiple rebel groups, I include a dichotomous variable, Multiparty Conflict, indicating whether a conflict involved multiple rebel groups fighting for similar political objectives. 16 Finally, I control for the country's Per Capita GDP; this variable is logged.
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Measuring Terrorism. Terrorism differs from other forms of violence against civilians in that it seeks to influence an audience beyond those targeted with violence. Civilians are the target of violence but not the target audience for violence; attacks are intended not to coerce civilians but to coerce the government into making concessions. Two key characteristics distinguish terrorism from other forms of violence against civilians: the first, related to the target of violence and the second, related to the nature of violence. First, because terrorism aims to coerce a wider audience beyond those immediately targeted for attack, terrorism does not require the identification of specific individuals for attack or the ability to convey a direct coercive threat to civilians. The target of violence, therefore, is not as narrow as in other strategies of violence against civilians. For this reason, terrorism does not need to involve faceto-face encounters; violence may be more removed. Second, because the aim of terrorism is to generate public pressure on the government to make concessions, violence is likely to be visible and public, aimed at imposing material and psychological damage on a broad section of the government's constituency. While some attacks on civilians using small arms may achieve public visibility and inflict widespread damage, in most cases, violence aimed at terrorism will require more substantial firepower. The use of bombs to attack civilian targets is the form of violence that most closely matches these characteristics; it is highly destructive, public violence with a broad target. RebelGroup Terrorism is a dichotomous variable, measuring whether a rebel group used small-scale bombs, such as car bombs, suicide bombs, or improvised explosive devices (IEDs), to attack civilian targets; the measure does not include artillery shelling or bombing of towns or cities. If a rebel group bombed a civilian target once or twice and there is no evidence that this constituted a pattern of behavior, I do not code the group as using terrorism.
My use of a dichotomous measure of rebel-group terrorism is a deliberate choice. Because the availability of information varies across countries, cross-national comparisons of either annual data or the number of incidents of violence are problematic.
18 And while annual data would permit a more fine-grained analysis of the relationship between democracy and terrorism by accounting for shifts in government regime type, it is unlikely that such analyses would produce substantially different results, as fewer than 25% of governments experienced a change in regime type while conflict was ongoing. I use multiple sources in my coding, including the U.S. Department of State annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; reports by Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, International Crisis Group, and the United Nations; as well as newspaper reports.
14 Coding of rebel group war aims is from Fearon and Laitin (2003) . I further differentiate between Rebel-Group LowCasualty Terrorism and Rebel-Group High-Casualty Terrorism by focusing on the target of attack. I code as low-casualty terrorism cases in which the rebel group bombed infrastructure targets, such as power stations, oil pipelines, or bridges; although attacking these types of targets imposes high costs on civilians by disrupting services or impeding transportation, casualties are rare. I code as high-casualty terrorism cases in which the rebel group bombed populated civilian targets, such as buses, restaurants, and markets. Twenty-nine of the 96 rebel groups in the data set, or 30.2%, used terrorism. Of these 29 rebel groups, 21 groups used primarily high-casualty terrorism, while eight used primarily low-casualty terrorism.
Data Analysis
As shown in Table 1 , among the 19 rebel groups fighting democratic opponents, terrorism is the dominant tactic, with 79.0% (15 rebel groups) bombing civilian targets. Among rebel groups fighting against nondemocratic governments, the use of terrorism is much less common. Of the 40 rebel groups fighting against anocratic governments-governments with both democratic and autocratic characteristics-11 groups (27.5%) bombed civilian targets. The percentage of groups using terrorism drops even further for rebel groups fighting against autocratic governments; only three of the 37 rebel groups facing autocratic opponents (8.1%) used terrorism.
Among rebel groups using terrorism, inclusive and exclusionary groups focus their attacks on different types of targets, as Table 2 shows. Inclusive rebel groups whose political objectives demand a broad base of civilian support tend to direct attacks against low-casualty targets, while exclusionary groups with narrower civilian constituencies tend to attack high-casualty targets. Of the nine inclusive rebel groups that engaged in terrorism, five groups (55.6%) focused their attacks on low-casualty targets; whereas among the 20 exclusionary rebel groups that used terrorism, only three groups (15.0%) attacked primarily low-casualty targets. In contrast, 85% of the exclusionary rebel groups using terrorism attacked high-casualty targets, while only 44.4% of the inclusive insurgencies attacked high-casualty targets.
To further explore the relationship between rebel-group terrorism, government regime type, and rebel-group political goals, I run two sets of statistical analyses, the results of which are shown in Table 3 . Model 1 is an analysis of rebel-group terrorism in general, including the bombing of low-and highcasualty targets, while Model 2 is an analysis of highcasualty terrorism. Because the dependent variables are dichotomous, I use binary logit models for both analyses. 19 To account for country-specific factors that may lead to correlation among conflicts occurring within the same country, I report robust standard errors, clustering cases by country.
Looking first at the results for terrorism in general, the coefficient for Government Level of Democracy is substantively large and statistically significant at the 0.01 level; the coefficient is positive, indicating that, as predicted by the hypothesis on government regime type, the more democratic a rebel group's opponent, the more likely it is that the rebel group will use terrorism. This relationship between government regime type and rebel-group terrorism holds even after controlling for the military strength of the rebel group, the intensity of the conflict, per capita GDP, and the presence of multiple rebel groups. 20 The results of the analysis of high-casualty terrorism (Model 2) are similar to the results for terrorism in general, but the one notable difference is that the coefficient for Inclusive Rebel Group, although negative in both analyses, reaches statistical significance only in Model 2. This finding indicates that while rebel groups with inclusive political objectives are not any less likely than exclusionary rebel groups to use terrorism in general, they are less likely to use high-casualty forms of terrorism, as the hypothesis on rebel-group political objectives predicts. Several additional findings are worth noting. First, the coefficient for Per Capita GDP is positive and statistically significant at the 0.10 level in Model 1 and falls just short of statistical significance in Model 2. Studies have found that transnational terrorist groups are more likely to target wealthy countries (Krueger and Laitin 2008) ; the findings here suggest a similar pattern among domestic insurgencies. If rebel groups use terrorism as a means of increasing the costs of the conflict for the government, it is not surprising that rebel groups are more likely to target wealthy opponents; accustomed to a high standard of living, citizens in wealthy countries may be particularly likely to demand changes in government policy as a means of halting terrorist violence. Second, the coefficient measuring the strength of the government relative to the rebel group is positive and statistically significant in Model 1, indicating that weaker rebel groups are more likely to engage in terrorism. 21 Third, the coefficients for Conflict Intensity, although positive, are not statistically significant; in civil wars, rebel groups do not appear to use terrorism as a means of coping with rising conflict costs. And finally, although the coefficient for Multiparty Conflict is positive in both analyses, it fails to reach standard levels of statistical significance. These findings raise questions about the validity of outbidding arguments, claiming that rival groups compete for popular support by carrying out dramatic attacks on the opponent's civilian constituency.
To facilitate interpretation of the substantive relationship between government regime type and rebel-group use of terrorism, Figure 1 shows the probability that a rebel group will engage in terrorism, when fighting against governments of different regime types; I calculate these probabilities for the modal rebel group: a group with exclusionary political objectives fighting in a multiparty conflict. 22 The likelihood of rebel-group terrorism increases dramatically as government regime type moves from autocratic to democratic; when confronting an autocratic government, exclusionary rebel groups have only a 9.4% likelihood of using terrorism, lending support to the argument that rebel groups think terrorism will be ineffective against an autocratic government unresponsive to public demands. The probability that an exclusionary rebel group will use terrorism is about four times greater, increasing to 36.9%, when the rebel group is fighting against an anocratic government, possessing characteristics of both autocracy and democracy. Perhaps most striking, however, is the result for democracy; when facing a fully democratic government, the likelihood that an exclusionary rebel group will use terrorism is 79.8%. The results for inclusive groups (Figure 2 in the online appendix) show a similar pattern. These results provide strong support for the first hypothesis, positing that rebel groups make calculations about whether to engage in terrorism based on an assessment of the regime type of their government opponent. To examine the second hypothesis, regarding the relationship between rebel-group political objectives and high-casualty terrorism, in Table 4 I calculate the probability of attacking high-casualty targets, for inclusive rebel groups as compared with exclusionary rebel groups. 23 Since the findings on terrorism indicate that rebel groups, indeed, are more likely to engage in terrorism the more democratic their opponent, the probabilities for rebel groups fighting against democracies are most relevant. For an exclusionary rebel group with a narrow base of civilian support, the likelihood of engaging in high-casualty terrorism is high, at 77.5%. The probability of attacking high-casualty targets drops more than 28 percentage points to 49.5% for an inclusive rebel group, one whose political objectives demand the maintenance of a broad base of civilian support.
Variation in Terrorist Bombing
While the statistical findings show that rebel groups fighting against democratic governments are more likely to use terrorism and that inclusive rebel groups select lower-casualty targets, these analyses tell us little about rebel-group motivations. To examine the causal mechanisms driving patterns in rebel-group behavior, the brief case studies in this section compare two rebel groups, both fighting against democratic opponents: the PKK, an exclusionary group fighting for Kurdish autonomy in Turkey, and the FMLN, an inclusive group fighting to control the central government in El Salvador. Among the 12 exclusionary rebel groups that have fought against democratic governments since 1989, the majority are separatist groups, like the PKK; and among the seven inclusive rebel groups fighting against democratic governments, all but one are leftist rebellions, like the FMLN. In addition, because El Salvador transitioned to democracy while conflict was ongoing, this case permits an examination of changes in FMLN strategy as the government democratized.
The PKK in Turkey. The PKK, led by Abdullah Ocalan, began advocating in the late-1970s for an independent Kurdish state in Turkey's eastern and southeastern regions and launched its first armed assaults in 1984. In its early years, the PKK primarily attacked military and police targets, although the group also killed civilians it suspected of collaborating with the government (Gunter 1997; Marcus 2007) . In mid-March 1993, the PKK announced a unilateral ceasefire and requested negotiations, but when the government refused, the PKK revoked its ceasefire and began attacking civilian targets in major cities. Ocalan made clear that the group's strategy was coercion, the aim being to use violence against civilians as a means of increasing the costs of the conflict for the government. As Agence France-Presse reported on June 8, 1993, Ocalan announced:
We are going to wage an all-out war against it [the government] until it agrees to negotiate. The Turkish state must understand once and for all it cannot To calculate these probabilities, I use Model 2 shown in Table 3 , holding relative strength, conflict intensity, and per capita GDP at their mean values.
annihilate us and that the only solution is to negotiate. Turkey will have a bloody summer if the army continues its campaign against us. We will hit economic and tourist interests throughout Turkey.
Several weeks later, the PKK carried out the attacks described in the introduction, exploding three bombs in Antalya. PKK attacks on civilian targets continued through 1995, with bombings of buses, bus stations, and tourist sites in Istanbul and coastal cities. 24 As the 1996 tourist season approached, Ocalan warned that ''Some of our fighters have set off for the south . . . that means Antalya, the tourist region . . . I have told my people to concentrate on economic targets . . . Our most important goal is to hurt the Turkish economy.'' 25 Although bombings slowed in 1996 and 1997, as police raids thwarted several attacks, bombings picked up again in 1998. 26 PKK terrorism is consistent in several respects with the arguments of this article. First, PKK bombing of civilian targets was a deliberate strategic choice. After lifting its ceasefire in June 1993, the PKK made clear in public statements its intention to attack civilian targets, particularly tourist sites in Istanbul and along Turkey's coast. Second, the strategic logic driving this violence was coercion. The shift in PKK tactics was a direct response to the government's refusal to negotiate in 1993. As Ocalan stated publicly, if attacks on military and police targets could not force negotiations, then perhaps attacks on civilian targets would. Third, the decision to attack civilian targets, as opposed to military targets, was linked to a perception by the PKK that such attacks would impose different kinds of costs on the Turkish government. Ocalan cited specifically the group's intention to impose costs on the economy and on the tourism industry. Fourth, although it is difficult to prove that the PKK attacked civilian targets because it believed that democracy made the government sensitive to civilian losses, it is clear from PKK statements that the PKK believed the government would be sensitive to civilian losses and the resultant costs to tourism and the economy. Finally, the PKK drew support from the Kurdish population, concentrated in the eastern and southeastern region of the country. This narrow, geographically concentrated base of civilian support made it possible for the PKK to attack high-casualty civilian targets outside of the separatist region without risking significant backlash from its civilian base; the PKK primarily attacked public sites in western Turkey where most civilian casualties would be Turks or foreigners.
The FMLN in El Salvador. Leftist opposition in El Salvador developed during the 1970s; in 1980, the major leftist groups announced the formation of a unified rebel group, the FMLN. During the first few years of conflict, the FMLN carried out a series of military offensives, with the aim of defeating the government militarily. As the government transitioned to democracy, creating a new constitution in 1983 and holding elections in 1984 and 1985, it intensified its military operations against the FMLN. The FMLN altered its strategy as well, shifting from conventional to unconventional warfare-launching small-scale ambushes on government forces and initiating a campaign of economic sabotage, involving attacks on bridges, Note: 95% confidence interval shown in parentheses for the first differences. Probabilities calculated for the modal rebel group: a group fighting in a multiparty conflict. Probabilities calculated using the following polity scores: -9 for autocracy (lowest score occurring in the data set); 0 for anocracy; 10 for democracy.
electric plants, and other infrastructure targets, as well as major export crops (Byrne 1996; Wood 2003) .
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FMLN attacks on economic and infrastructure targets caused an estimated $263.9 million of damage in 1984 (Byrne 1996, 149) . The following year, according to FMLN estimates, the group carried out 50 attacks on power lines, 700 attacks on other utility posts, and 12 attacks on coffee processing facilities. 28 The FMLN expanded its sabotage campaign in the late 1980s and by the war's end, the United States estimated that total damage from the FMLN's sabotage campaign had exceeded $2 billion.
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FMLN commander, Joaquin Villalobos, in a 1986 written statement, explained that the shift to a campaign of economic sabotage was deliberate, describing the strategy as a ''destabilisation plan, the objective of which is to destroy the foundations of the war economy while preventing the fulfilment of the [government's] project of capitalist modernisation aimed at reactivating the economy and securing the system's survival. '' 30 Another FMLN commander, Miguel Castellanos, also emphasized the importance of targeting the already weak economy. Further economic decline might increase public opposition to the government, which was particularly dangerous for the government following its transition to democracy. Castellanos described the logic in an interview:
This economic crisis should always be kept in the forefront because it became a serious encumbrance for the opening that the democratic process provided. This crisis was a fundamental limitation in being able to win over the masses. The FMLN analyzed this situation and intensified economic sabotage. (Prisk 1991, 72-73) The FMLN continued attacking economic and infrastructure targets after peace negotiations began, launching more than 1,000 attacks on electric lines and power stations in 1990, leading to an estimated $125 million in losses to the El Salvadoran economy (U.S. Department of State 1992). According to an Associated Press report on November 20, 1990, when negotiations stalemated, the FMLN intensified its attacks and issued a statement signed by the group's five senior commanders indicating that this escalation of violence was intended to force additional government concessions.
As in the PKK case, a number of aspects of the FMLN case are consistent with the arguments put forth in this article. First, as the statements of FMLN leaders show, the shift to attacking infrastructure targets in the mid-1980s was intentional. Second, the FMLN's decision to attack infrastructure targets was motivated by a perception that such attacks would be costly to the government, in light of the country's ongoing economic difficulties. The FMLN believed that these costs were particularly problematic for the government because it had transitioned to democracy and, therefore, needed to maintain public support to remain in power. Third, although initially the FMLN's sabotage campaign was part of a strategy aimed at weakening the government enough to make overthrow possible, once it became clear that this was unlikely, the FMLN used attacks on infrastructure targets as a means of coercing the government to make concessions during peace negotiations. And finally, as a revolutionary rebellion competing with the government to build a national base of support, the FMLN avoided attacks on high-casualty targets that might have generated public backlash and instead focused its attacks on lowcasualty infrastructure targets. In interviews, FMLN commanders confirmed that this avoidance of civilian casualties was intentional.
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Alternative Explanations. Arguments emphasizing the military context cannot account for the patterns of violence observed in these two cases. The evidence does not indicate that the PKK began bombing civilian targets in 1993 because it was unable to confront Turkish forces directly. In fact, from 1984 to 1999, the PKK launched 609 attacks on Turkish government, police, and military targets-more than five times the number of attacks (120) it carried out against civilian targets.
32 Some might claim that the timing of the FMLN's decision to bomb infrastructure targets was driven by a decline in the group's strength, rather than a change in the government's regime type. The government did alter its military strategy in the mid1980s, launching more frequent offensives and using aerial bombardment against FMLN positions, which prompted the FMLN to shift from conventional to guerrilla attacks; but while the tactics the FMLN used 27 See also ''Army and Rebels Step Up Offensive,'' Latin American Regional Reports: Mexico & Central America Report, RM-84-10, 30 November 1984, 3. 28 Byrne (1996, 149) Finally, neither the PKK nor the FMLN adopted terrorism as a means of outbidding rival rebel groups. The PKK formed during the 1970s, at a time when many different rightist, leftist, and Kurdish organizations were competing with one another (Gunter 1997; Marcus 2007) ; during this period, terrorist bombings were common, as outbidding arguments would predict. This competition among rival groups, however, died out following the military coup in 1980; and although the PKK reemerged in the mid1980s, most of the other groups did not renew their activities, leaving the PKK as the only significant rebel group fighting for Kurdish autonomy. Outbidding arguments cannot explain, therefore, why the PKK used terrorism in the context of the civil war that began in 1984; nor can outbidding arguments explain why PKK terrorism increased dramatically in the early 1990s. At the start of the conflict in El Salvador in the late-1970s, five different insurgent groups were active (Wood 2003) . Before these groups merged to form the FMLN, several groups bombed infrastructure targets, as the outbidding hypothesis would predict. What the outbidding argument cannot explain, however, is why bombings continued long after the five groups joined to create the FMLN or why the FMLN stepped up bombings of infrastructure targets in the mid-to late-1980s.
Conclusion
Existing studies group together all forms of wartime violence against civilians, labeling it as civilian targeting and largely ignoring variation in forms of violence against civilians. Yet rebel groups choose particular forms of violence deliberately, in light of their strategic objectives. In deciding whether to use terrorism, rebel groups consider whether the government will respond to violence by making concessions. Rebel groups challenging democratic governments are more likely to use terrorism, believing that their opponents will be sensitive to civilian losses and, therefore, likely to make concessions as a means of halting terrorist violence. The statistical evidence provides support for this claim; the likelihood that a rebel group will use terrorism when faced with a democratic opponent is 79.8%, as compared with a 9.4% likelihood of terrorism when fighting an autocratic opponent.
While all rebel groups have incentives to use terrorism when fighting democratic opponents, rebel groups weigh the costs of terrorism differently, depending on their political objectives. Rebel groups competing with the government to build a broad base of civilian support are likely to be concerned about popular backlash in response to violence and, therefore, select targets that impose costs without inflicting high civilian casualties. As the statistical results show, when facing a democratic opponent, rebel groups with inclusive political objectives and broad civilian constituencies are 28 percentage points less likely to attack high-casualty civilian targets than rebel groups with exclusionary political objectives and narrow civilian constituencies. Consistent with this argument, the FMLN, a revolutionary insurgency seeking to build a broad base of support, bombed infrastructure targets, inflicting few civilian casualties. In contrast, the PKK, a separatist insurgency with a narrow, geographically concentrated base of civilian support, had greater flexibility to attack high-casualty targets and regularly bombed populated civilian targets.
The findings in this article are relevant to ongoing debates about the relationship between democracy and terrorism. Shifting the focus away from transnational violence and toward domestic violence-and in particular, toward civil wars-generates an ideal universe of cases in which to study this relationship. Rebel groups engaged in civil wars face similar strategic circumstances and yet vary in their use of terrorism. Examining this variation in rebel-group strategies of violence shows that, in the context of civil war, government regime type does, indeed, influence the likelihood that a rebel group will use terrorism. Moving beyond debates about democracy and terrorism, the evidence presented in this article also addresses questions about the determinants of wartime violence against civilians. Although existing studies have focused on the ways in which the military context shapes belligerent behavior, the findings in this article show that rebel groups also evaluate the broader strategic context, weighing how two key audiences-their government opponent and their own civilian constituency-will respond to violence.
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